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ARTICLES]




The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services,' as well as recent advances in our under-
standing of human reproduction, has prompted new dialogue on the
legal status of the unborn and on the level of legal protection appro-
priate for potential human life. In joining the dialogue, this commen-
tary is prompted by several concerns. First, the landmark decision in
Roe v. Wade2 has frequently been misunderstood, creating much
confusion over the permissible boundaries of protecting potential
human life. A debate about laws pertaining to the unborn must be
founded upon a proper understanding of what the Supreme Court
said and did in Roe. Second, since the Roe decision, the legal protec-
tions afforded the unborn have expanded. Yet many of the changes
are unrelated to the Roe decision or to abortion generally. These
changes are often interesting and controversial, but are shielded
from public view. While the need for significant change in the legal
status of the unborn still exists, many of the changes will not be
driven by U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements on abortion. Thus,
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Colby College, 1970; J.D., The
University of Chicago, 1974. This commentary was developed from remarks given on Novem-
ber 30, 1989 at the Social Science Research Institute of Northern Illinois University as part of
a series of colloquia on abortion.
I. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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contemporary debates about the unborn should continue, but the de-
bates should include a more thorough consideration of laws outside
the abortion context. Third, a review of American laws demonstrates
that current legal treatment of the unborn is both inconsistent and
inadequate. Such failings should be corrected.
II. Understanding Roe v. Wade
Any discussion of the legal status of the unborn necessarily in-
volves consideration of the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe
v. Wade. Unfortunately, many people continue to misunderstand the
case. Roe involved a challenge to a Texas criminal law prohibiting
all abortions except those aimed at saving maternal life.' Finding a
constitutional privacy right to choose abortion4 and no constitutional
protection of the unborn, 5 the Court invalidated the Texas law. In
doing so, the Court indicated that states could regulate abortions to
promote maternal health, particularly after the first trimester.' The
Court further noted that abortion regulations could protect potential
human life, but only after fetal viability has been determined; only
then does governmental interest in the unborn become compelling.7
Much misunderstanding of Roe arises from two erroneous
premises. One premise involves the legal personhood of the unborn.
In Roe, the Court held that the word "person," as used in the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution, does not include the
unborn.' Thus, the Court determined that the amendment's protec-
tion of the right to life does not extend to the fetus.9 Many courts
have inferred from this holding that the unborn can never be "per-
sons" under law, can never be afforded a right to life, and can never
be treated comparably to persons born alive. 10 Such inferences are
3. Id. at 117, n.l.
4. Id. at 153 ("This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
5. Id. at 158 ("All this . . . persuades us that the word 'person' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
6. Id. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the
health of the mother, the 'compelling' point . . . is at approximately the end of the first tri-
mester . . . . [Flrom and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health.").
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ("With respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is viability . . . . State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.").
8. Id. at 158.
9. Id. at 156-57.
10. Such inferences are undoubtedly influenced by the remarks in Roe v. Wade that, in
"areas other than criminal abortion the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life
• . . begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined
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wrong. In law, the term "person" has several meanings; there is no
singular use of the word. Consider distinctions among "persons"
granted the right to marry, 1 the right to drink, 2 and the right to
drive a car.' 3 Another example of multipile meanings of a word is
found in the federal constitution itself, where the term "state" as
used in the fourteenth amendment has a very different meaning from
the term "state" as used in the eleventh amendment." Therefore,
legal personhood must always be defined by context.
A second erroneous premise regarding Roe involves the stage at
which state governments can protect the unborn. In Roe, the Court
held that the State of Texas could prohibit abortions of viable fe-
tuses except when maternal life or health is at risk. 5 The Court
sanctioned protection of viable fetuses because the state has a "com-
pelling" interest in the potential human life of the fetuses. The Court
distinguished viable fetuses from other fetuses based on the "capabil-
ity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.' 6 From this rea-
soning, many courts have erroneously inferred that the unborn can
only be protected after the point of viability, and that the previable
fetus and the preconceived unborn can never be protected.' 7 Such
inferences are wrong. The point when governmental interest in the
unborn is compelling was a crucial issue before the Roe Court since
the Court had already determined that the Texas law placed a heavy
burden on a woman's abortion decision-a decision protected by the
federal constitution. Earlier cases had clearly established that when
constitutional rights are burdened, government regulations that cre-
ate the burden can only be sustained when the state has a compelling
situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth." Id. at 161.
11. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (marriage
certificates issued to parties 18 years or older or to those 16 or 17 years old who have parental
consent or judicial approval).
12. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 131 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (sales or other deliv-
eries of alcohol allowed only to persons 21 years of age or older).
13. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 /2, para. 6-107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (drivers
licenses issued to applicants over the age of 16).
14. The fourteenth amendment includes cities and counties in its definition of "state"
while the eleventh amendment does not.
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
16. Id. at 163.
17. For example, in People v. Smith, 59 Cal. 3d 751, 575, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496, 502
(1976) the court said:
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability is
reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in
Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a
non-viable fetus is not taking a human life. It follows that such destruction can-
not constitute murder or other form of homicide, whether committed by a
mother, a father (as here), or a third person.
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interest."8 Yet, earlier cases also held that when no constitutional
right is burdened, governmental laws will be sustained as long as
they are rational.19 In Roe, the Court expressly recognized that
Texas's interest in protecting all forms of potential human life is al-
ways "important and legitimate," though not always compelling."0
Thus, governments can, in some instances, protect the potential life
of the postconception but previable, as well as the preconceived,
unborn.
Despite misconceptions about Roe, since 1973, states have en-
acted a variety of new laws aimed at protecting the unborn.21 These
protections apply both within and without the abortion setting. Re-
cent advances in knowledge about human conception, pregnancy,
and birth have prompted the development of these new laws.22
Policies underlying the laws that protect potential human life
embrace two related concerns. One concern is that the human un-'
born of today will be born alive tomorrow. This was Texas's concern
in Roe, and is the concern behind some, but not all, contemporary
abortion regulations. 23 The second concern is that the unborn will
have the opportunity to live a whole or unimpaired life after birth.
This concern is frequently expressed in contemporary debate about
laws on prenatal torts and on drug-exposed newborns. 4
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (indicating that, in addition to the necessary compelling inter-
est, sustainable regulations should also "be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake").
19. After Roe, these cases led the Court to sustain public funding laws that distin-
guished abortion expenses from childbirth expenses. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473-78 (1977) (finding that laws funding childbirth but not abortion impinge upon no funda-
mental right and are rationally related to the legitimate purpose of protecting potential human
life).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
21. The unborn are now protected by new laws criminalizing third party conduct against
the unborn; new laws permitting broader tort remedies against those hindering live and
healthy births; and, new laws expanding parental duties to include duties directed toward un-
born children. See. e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West 1987) (murder of unborn); Ren-
slow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (preconception tort); and
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West. Supp. 1989) ("deprived child" includes drug depen-
dent newborn).
22. Consider that medical advances have allowed states to eliminate the "born alive"
rule in criminal cases. See Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the
Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1985).
23. The protection of potential human life is the cornerstone of laws prohibiting most
third trimester abortions, as well as laws financing the childbirth-but not the abor-
tion-expenses of indigent women. Many other abortion laws, including those covering medical
facilities and professionals, are founded chiefly on promoting the health of pregnant women.
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (a state has a greater opportunity to promote maternal health in
abortion after first trimester), 147-52 (noting uncertainty about purpose(s) of many 19th cen-
tury criminal abortion laws).
24. See, e.g., Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLuM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 47 (1978); Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, II NAT'L L.J. I (Oct. 3, 1988).
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Often, both the general populace and individuals, including pro-
spective parents who have particularized interests in securing the ac-
tual and healthy birth of certain unborn, support the policy of pro-
tecting potential life. In this situation, laws protecting potential
human life are usually not controversial. Consider, for example, laws
providing a low-income pregnant woman with access to medical care,
food, and shelter,2" laws promoting research about, as well as greater
public understanding of, ways to prevent handicaps at birth,2" and
laws deterring third-party conduct that will likely result in disabili-
ties at birth.27
In other situations, however, public and individual interest in
protecting certain unborn diverge. Here, governmental choices about
the extent to which laws should protect potential life are more prob-
lematic. The controversy over the Texas abortion scheme in Roe is
illustrative: the state supported, and a woman opposed, the protec-
tion of a certain unborn's potentiality for life. The decision in Roe
suggests that affording protection to the unborn will be more difficult
to sustain when the law burdens fundamental rights. While Roe in-
volved the fundamental right to abort, other fundamental interests
possibly burdened by laws protecting potential life include child-
birth,28 childrearing,29 and bodily autonomy.
30
Many types of laws and lawmakers can promote protection of
the unborn. Certain legal issues are more appropriate for state gov-
ernments, such as crimes against the unborn, torts, and child cus-
25. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (treatment for
substance abuse provided for pregnant women in accordance with Illinois Medicaid program).
26. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 241(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990) (Secretary of Health and
Human Services authorized to make grants to encourage research relating to the prevention of
physical and mental diseases and impairments of man); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 863, ch.
127, para. 55.50 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (educational programs on alcohol, drug, and to-
bacco use during pregnancy).
27. Consider. for example, laws that make third-parties criminally (feticide) or civilly
(prebirth torts) liable for conduct that causes injury to a fetus.
28. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to privacy encompasses deci-
sions on "whether to bear or beget a child"). The state may seek to protect potential human
life and may burden the privacy right to bear or beget a child by imposing upon pregnant
women one form of childbirth (C-section) over another (natural).
29. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (right to conceive and right to raise
children are deemed "essential" rights). The state may seek to protect potential human life
and may burden the right to conceive and the right to raise children by imposing upon preg-
nant women responsibilities (e.g. to take medicine or refrain from sex or alcoholic consump-
tion) regarding the care of their unborn children.
30. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) ("substantial privacy interests" in "surgi-
cal search and seizure"). The state may seek to protect potential human life and may burden
the right to bodily autonomy by imposing upon pregnant women intrusive medical procedures
(fetal surgery).
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tody;31 other problems are best addressed on a national level, such as
how to subsidize research on and access to prenatal care.3 2 Laws
protecting the unborn either serve the unborn exclusively, or promote
simultaneously the interests of .the unborn and of others such as pro-
spective mothers.3
Some lawmakers protect potential human life by equating the
human unborn with those born alive, creating parity between people
of tomorrow and people here today. For example, under California
law, an already-born child and a developing fetus may each be vic-
tims of parental abuse and neglect.3 4 Other lawmakers protect poten-
tial human life by passing legislation directed solely at the unborn.
For example, both Minnesota and Illinois have separate homicide
and feticide laws within their criminal codes. 5
Governments are more free to act when no constitutionally-pro-
tected rights are implicated. Since pregnant women as well as fertile
women and men can often assert constitutional rights in challenging
laws protecting their potential offspring, many laws protecting poten-
tial human life focus on nonparental conduct.36 Protective laws that
do address prospective parents' conduct are often welcomed by
would-be parents. 7 The most controversial laws are those that co-
31. For a critique of one state's laws in these areas, see Parness, Protection of Potential
Human Life in Illinois: Policy and Law at Odds, 5 N. ILL. L. REV. I (1984).
32. See. e.g., 42 U.S.CA. § 701(a)(l) (West Supp. 1990) (money for states to provide
prenatal care); 42 U.S.C.A. § 241(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (money for research on dis-
ease control).
33. Laws directed toward prebirth maternal child abuse or neglect protect the unborn
exclusively; laws directed toward uninvited third party assaults (crimes or torts) on the unborn
offspring of pregnant women protect the prospective mothers as well as the unborn.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
35. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp. 1989) (first degree murder), § 609.2661
(West 1987) (first degree murder of unborn child); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (mur-
der), para. 9-1.2 (homicide of an unborn child, defined as an individual "from fertilization
until birth") (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
Unlike Illinois and Minnesota, some states confine their feticide laws to acts causing the
death of viable or quick fetuses. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00 (homicide means con-
duct causing the death of an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more
than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting abortion in the first degree), §
125.45 (abortion in the first degree involves a nonjustifiable abortional act) (McKinney 1987);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988) (feticide includes the killing of an unborn child so far devel-
oped as to be ordinarily called "quick"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973) (willful killing of
an unborn quick child may be manslaughter).
A Minnesota homicide statute covering unborn children (viable and previable alike) was
recently sustained when challenged on various federal constitutional grounds. See State v.
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990). See also Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1388
(11 th Cir. 1987) (sustaining Georgia feticide statute).
36. Consider, for example, laws criminalizing conduct against the unborn but exempting
pregnant women from prosecution. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-266 (West 1987).
37. For example, prospective parents welcome laws that provide financial support for
research into the means of securing more live and healthy babies. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §
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erce prospective parents in order to benefit their future offspring."8
When such coercion constitutes significant burdens on fundamental
rights, governmental action must, of course, serve some compelling
interest.
111. Expanding Protections of Potential Human Life
The recent growth in American laws protecting potential human
life has been significant. A brief examination reveals variations in
the types of laws and lawmakers now concerned with promoting the
birth of healthy infants.
A major development in the post-Roe regulation of nonparental
activities is the creation of laws characterizing the unborn as victims
of crime. In 1986, Minnesota adopted a statutory scheme providing
broad criminal law protection of the unborn.3 9 The scheme encom-
passes various forms of culpable activity that cause injury to the un-
born, including premeditated, intentional, grossly negligent, and neg-
ligent acts.4" The scheme also covers varying forms of injury to the
unborn, including pregnancy termination and injuries surfacing at or
after live birth.4"
Also in 1986, Illinois adopted a scheme similar to Minnesota's,
with the unborn deemed possible victims of intentional homicide, vol-
untary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide,
battery, and aggravated battery.4" Of course, such alterations of
criminal laws can influence existing and related civil laws. For exam-
ple, the court-recognized duty of due care under tort law is often
guided by legislative policies underlying criminal law.
43
Tort law has also recently expanded to embrace nonparental
conduct affecting the unborn. Courts now generally recognize claims
by those alleging that prebirth misconduct by doctors and others
caused their disabilities.44 In many states, claimants include those
241(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
38. Consider, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (parental duty to fur-
nish care to children conceived but not yet born).
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-.269 (West 1987).
40. Id. §§ 609.2661-.2665, 609.2672 (West 1987 & West Supp. 1990).
41. Id. §§ 609.2661-.268 (West 1987 & West Supp. 1990).
42. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990). See also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-02 to 12.1-17.1-06 (Supp. 1989) (beginning in
1987, new crimes against the unborn include murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, ag-
gravated assault, and assault).
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
79-80 (1975).
44. Claimants may include those injured as a result of misconduct directed at men. See,
e.g., Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219,
1245 (1986) (examples of fetal injury due to paternal occupational exposure).
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who were previable fetuses at the time of the alleged misconduct. 5
A few states have gone further, permitting claims by those who were
not even conceived at the time of the alleged misconduct." For ex-
ample, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed a claim against medical
personnel by a child who was disabled as a result of a negligent
blood transfusion to her mother nine years earlier, at which time the
mother was thirteen years old.47
Laws addressing the conduct of prospective parents in order to
protect the potential life of their future offspring often raise little
controversy. Consider, for example, laws granting financial support
for prenatal care,48 laws providing pregnant women with opportuni-
ties for treatment of drug or alcohol abuse, 49 and laws requiring
warning labels on products known to cause birth disabilities.5 These
laws are relatively noncontroversial because they are noncoercive.
Among the most controversial of all laws protecting potential
human life are laws that seek to compel certain behavior of potential
parents, especially pregnant women. As noted earlier, these laws
often impact upon constitutionally protected rights; when they do,
the laws can only be sustained if the state demonstrates a compelling
interest.
Laws addressing substance abuse during pregnancy exemplify
the controversy over coercive governmental action. Consider laws
that make substance abuse during pregnancy the basis of: (1) a
criminal prosecution for prenatal child abuse or neglect, 51 (2) an or-
der terminating parental rights based upon prenatal conduct,52 and/
or (3) an injunction restricting the activities of a prospective parent
in order to protect an unborn child.5"
45. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I11. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988) (reviewing recent
developments).
46. Monusko v. Postle, 175 Mich. App. 269, 437 N.W.2d 367 (1989) (reviewing recent
preconception tort cases). See also Note, Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging
Tort, 67 GEo. L. 1239 (1979).
47. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Of course, there is significant controversy
over government subsidy of childbirth expenses, but not expenses related to abortion.
49. See supra note 25.
50. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (West Supp. 1990) (requirement that cigarette pack-
ages and ads bear rotational health warnings, including a warning to pregnant women about
the dangers to the unborn posed by smoking); 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (West Supp. 1990) (require-
ments of warnings on labels of alcoholic beverage containers regarding the dangers posed to
the unborn by alcohol).
51. Although there now appears to be no such explicit laws, there was an unsuccessful
attempt in California a few years ago to employ a more general misdemeanor provision to
cover such a case. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3, -13 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN, §§ 253B.05, 626.5561 (West Supp. 1990) (emergency
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Criminal prosecutions against women who take certain drugs
during pregnancy may be permitted in some parts of the country. In
California, for example, a provision of the Penal Code makes it a
misdemeanor when a parent willfully fails to furnish remedial care
for his or her conceived but unborn child. 4 This law applies equally
to prospective mothers and prospective fathers.
The California law could conceivably be applied to pregnant,
drug-taking women without infringement on constitutional rights.
Such an application would promote what the Roe Court deemed to
be a state's "important and legitimate" interest in the unborn. None-
theless, the much-publicized dismissal of child abuse charges against
Pamela Rae Stewart in 1986 casts a cloud over the California stat-
ute's future utility.
55
Ms. Stewart, while pregnant, ignored a doctor's advise to dis-
continue amphetamine use, to abstain from sex (because her pla-
centa had detached), and to seek immediate medical attention if she
hemorrhaged. The court read the statute narrowly and deemed that
the law related solely to furnishing financial support for a fetus.5
The apparent failure to consider criminal charges against the pro-
spective father, whose own conduct was not exemplary,57 does sug-
gest that criminal prosecutions based upon drug use during preg-
nancy potentially involve issues of discrimination against women.
The California law correctly recognizes comparable male and female
responsibilities toward their unborn offspring; enforcement efforts
must be initiated accordingly.
Consider as well the prosecution of a woman for delivering
drugs to her newborn child through the umbilical cord. Although
such a situation evinces concern about prenatal child abuse, utiliza-
tion of criminal statutes prohibiting the delivery of a controlled sub-
admission to treatment facility is authorized for pregnant drug-using woman who refuses or
fails to seek recommended treatment).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
55. Facts about Pamela Rae Stewart's case can be found in Note, The Criminalization
of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND.
L.J. 357 (1988-89) (reviewing the Stewart case and urging restraints on the use of criminal
penalties against pregnant women); Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 277 (1987-88) (same). See also Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The
Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1988) (similar).
56. See Note, Pregnancy Police, supra note 55, at 287.
57. See Pollitt, Fetal Rights: A New Assault on Feminism; Laws Protecting the Fetus
from the Mother, The Nation, Mar. 26, 1990, at 409, 416. See also Note, Pregnancy Police,
supra note 55, at 316-17; In re Dodge, 8 Kan. App. 2d 259, 655 P.2d 135 (1982) (termination
of mother's parental rights based upon her failure to take steps to keep her husband from
impairing their child's health).
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stance presents problems5" that could be avoided if statutes more di-
rectly addressed the problem of prenatal abuse.
A simple hypothetical illustrates possible civil court involvement
in terminating parental rights for prebirth conduct and in enjoining
certain acts of prospective parents in order to protect their unborn
offspring. Consider a scenario involving a potential parent whose
conduct causes significant harm to an unborn child. How concerned
must a court be about the parent's prebirth conduct before it will
terminate the parent's rights in the later-born child? Assuming a
constitutionally protected interest would be implicated, what compel-
ling state interest, especially in conduct that is non-criminal, would
sufficiently justify an injunction restricting the actions of a prospec-
tive parent in order to protect an unborn child?
Courts and legislatures that create child custody laws are in-
creasingly concerned with the prebirth conduct of prospective par-
ents. Lawmakers have recently determined that a drug-addicted in-
fant can be found to be abused or neglected by a mother who took
illegal drugs during pregnancy. 9 Courts have also ruled that certain
prenatal acts of a potential father constitute child abandonment, jus-
tifying termination of his parental rights.60 Accordingly, the Florida
Supreme Court recently ruled that a man who fails to support his
unborn child's mother during her pregnancy loses standing in a later
adoption proceeding. 1 Specifically, the court stated that "[b]ecause
prenatal care of the pregnant mother and unborn child is critical to
the well-being of the child and of society, the biological father, wed
or unwed, has a responsibility to provide support during the prebirth
period."62
Recently, there has been increasing interest in developing the
legal means to prevent potential harm to the unborn by prospective
parents. In the last few years, some courts have considered ordering
58. Problems of statutory construction include whether the newborn is a person to whom
delivery of drugs can be made given the attachment to the mother, and whether such a prose-
cution encompasses a form of conduct that the law was meant to address.
59. See. e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § I lot (West Supp. 1990) ("deprived child"
includes some children born in a condition of drug dependence), § 1130 (West 1987) (circum-
stances under which there can be a termination of parental rights for a deprived child); In re
Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (though legislation does not specifically
refer to prenatal conduct or to drug dependence at birth, court finds newborn suffering from
narcotics withdrawal symptoms may be considered a neglected child); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio
Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. 1986) (child abuse based solely upon prenatal heroin use
by mother).
60. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643
(1975).
61. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
62. Id. at 746.
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pregnant women who take illegal drugs, or otherwise act dangerously
with respect to their unborn babies' health, to cooperate with health
officials in order to protect their unborn children. These orders have
been considered by both civil6" and criminal 4 courts. While such or-
ders have met with difficulty during criminal sentencing," civil court
orders have had limited success.6" In 1989, Minnesota enacted laws
permitting court-ordered confinement of drug-using pregnant women
under the state's existing involuntary commitment provisions for al-
coholic, drug addicted, and mentally ill persons.67 Occasionally,
courts have recognized prebirth paternity actions filed for the pur-
pose of securing support for the unborn child and the prospective
mother.68
Can court orders proscribe potential parents' noncriminal con-
duct that, although constitutionally protected, is harmful to potential
human life?6 9 In a 1983 case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court confronted the issue when it was urged to order a pregnant
woman to undergo a "purse string" operation so that her cervix
would better hold the pregnancy.7" In declining to issue the order,
the state high court said:
We do not decide whether, in some situations, there would
be justification for ordering a wife to submit to medical treat-
ment in order to assist carrying a child to term. Perhaps the
State's interest, in some cases, might be sufficiently compelling
• . . to justify such a restriction on a person's constitutional
63. See, e.g., In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (superior
court); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (probate and family court); In re
Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (probate court).
64. See, e.g., Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, 74 A.B.A. J. 20 (1988) (case of Brenda
Vaughan who was convicted of theft).
65. See, e.g., State v. Mosburg, 13 Kan. App. 2d 257, 768 P.2d 313 (1989) (noting that
criminal court probation orders prohibiting pregnancy have generally failed because they have
been deemed to be not reasonably. related to the probationer's past and future criminality, not
related to the rehabilitative process, or overly broad).
66. Cases and commentaries can be found in Comment, In re A.C.: Foreshadowing the
Unfortunate Expansion of Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 74 IOwA L. REV. 287 (1988);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051
(1981); Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.02, 253B.05, 626.5561 (West Supp. 1990). See also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30.4 C-II (West 1981) (endangered unborn child can be subjected to agency's
care and custody).
68. See, e.g., Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1982).
69. Consider Pamela Rae Stewart's failure to abstain from sex and her consumption of
drugs during pregnancy. See Note, Criminalization of Maternal Misconduct, supra note 55,
at 358.
70. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983).
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right of privacy.7
The door was properly left open. Factors relevant to a determination
that such an order is justified include the burden placed on the indi-
vidual's constitutional rights, the nature and certainty of harm to
potential life or to maternal health, and the possible alternatives to
coercive governmental action.
7 2
Such factors should be applied by courts on a case by case ba-
sis. Consider a case in which a pregnant woman has only a fifty per-
cent chance to survive natural childbirth and her viable fetus has
only a one percent chance to survive natural birth. If the woman
refuses to undergo a caesarean section, though it would increase the
chances of survival for both her and her child to almost 100%,
should the state intervene? 73 In this case, the impact upon the wo-
man's constitutional right to refuse treatment for herself is seem-
ingly outweighed by the risk to the fetus, the significant chance of
death of the mother, and the increased chance of fetal/maternal sur-
vival if a caesarean section is performed.
Equal protection concerns are often raised in cases in which the
medical procedure is one that may not usually be compelled for non-
pregnant women. Consider the case in which a woman refuses to
consent to a blood transfusion. Nonpregnant women may have a con-
stitutionally protected right to refuse a transfusion even though
death may result. A court-ordered transfusion, however, may be per-
missible if the woman is pregnant.
State intervention rarely occurs in situations in which a medical
procedure will benefit the fetus and will benefit or at least not harm
the woman because the women in these situations typically submit to
the procedure." Procedures that would only benefit the fetus and
that would probably harm the woman7" are more problematic.
Again, many women will undergo the procedure to benefit the fetus.
If the woman refuses the procedure, however, the state may object.
71. Id. at 397.
72. But see, Comment, In re A.C.. supra note 66 (reviewing factors and cases, and opin-
ing that the balancing test should be abandoned).
73. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981) (medical procedures ordered for pregnant woman when there was a 99-100% chance
of fetal death and a 50% chance of maternal death without the procedures, and nearly a
100% chance that both would survive with them).
74. But see id. (caesarian section would benefit both fetus and mother but was opposed
by mother because of her religious beliefs).
75. See, e.g., Surgeons Fix Birth Defect in Fetus, Chi. Trib. May 31, 1990, § I, at 6,
col. 1; Doctors Perform First Heart Operation on Baby in the Womb, Chi. Trib. Feb. 1, 1990,
§ 1, at 11, col. 1. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990)
(living wills inapplicable to most pregnant women).
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Then, a case by case approach seems necessary, with the opportunity
for judicial review.
Pregnant women are not the only group subject to court orders
pertaining to fetuses. Fathers, too, are subject to legal action on be-
half of the unborn. For example, an Arkansas statute expressly rec-
ognizes prebirth paternity actions and permits courts to order alleged
prospective fathers to render financial aid and other support to preg-
nant women and their fetuses.7 6 Courts considering such orders
should employ a balancing test. Male respondents are less likely to
raise fundamental constitutional rights than pregnant women are
when responding to government-initiated injunction actions.
Like prenatal abuse laws, coercive laws proscribing abortion are
controversial because they involve prospective parents and frequently
implicate fundamental constitutional rights. Notwithstanding the
difficulties posed by Roe v. Wade, since 1973, many states have at-
tempted to protect the unborn via abortion regulations. Some states
have banned nontherapeutic, third-trimester abortions, 7 as expressly
permitted by the Roe Court.78 Other states have gone further by try-
ing to move up the point of viability.79
Such attempts, however, offer little protection to potential
human life, as most abortions occur long before fetal viability is pos-
sible. Similarly, prohibitions on so-called'sex selection abortions80
(regardless of their constitutional status)81 now fail to protect signifi-
cant numbers of unborn. State laws foreclosing the involvement of
public monies, hospitals, and employees with abortions today afford
more significant protection of potential life.82 Yet, such laws clearly
operate disproportionately on the poor; thus, in some states, the con-
stitutional protections afforded by Roe may only be exercised by the
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-103 (1987) (in paternity action court may make temporary
orders pending birth).
77. See ILL. ANN, STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-25(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT § 188.030(1) (Vernon 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (states can proscribe postviability abor-
tions except those needed to preserve maternal life or health).
79. Compare Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976)
(upholding a definition of viability which includes the "stage of fetal development when the-
life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial
life-supportive systems") with Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 380 n.I and 390-94 (1979)
(striking down a viability determination requirement that necessitated an inquiry into whether
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable").
80. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
81. See, e.g., Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion
Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281 (1981).
82. Those laws have been sustained in a number of cases, including Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); and
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1979).
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upper and middle classes. Given the protection of the abortion choice
under Roe, some state courts have made abortion more uniformly
available by interpreting state law to require governmental financial
support for poor women who wish to exercise their decisional rights
under Roe.83
Regulations proscribing abortion occasionally promote other in-
terests as well. Consider, for example, laws requiring a pregnant wo-
man to notify her husband or the potential father of her intent to
abort.8 ' Similarly, consider laws requiring a pregnant minor to no-
tify, or to obtain consent from, her parents or guardian.8" Such laws
arguably promote governmental interests in informed decision mak-
ing, family autonomy, and the procreative potential of men. Yet,
most are clearly "pro-life." They usually do not apply when birth,
rather than pregnancy, termination is contemplated. Similarly, most
laws mandating that certain information be conveyed to pregnant
women who are considering abortion are "pro-life" laws in that the
required information encourages the choice of childbirth.8" Laws re-
quiring an informed decision about abortion are unique; similar laws
regarding other important decisions do not exist. Consider that we
do little to promote informed decisions about marriage. We do not
require that the prospective bride and groom be told about the statis-
tical likelihood of divorce; there are no required screenings of "The
War of the Roses."
IV. The Inadequacies and Inconsistencies of Legal Protection for
the Unborn
A few questions remain. Will the recent decision in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services"' significantly alter the contemporary
debate over protecting potential life? What problems-if any-exist
83. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); Moe v. Secretary of
Admin. and Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Comm. to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779 (1981). Compare Fischer v. Dep't. of Public
Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985) (funding to indigent women for safe delivery does
not oblige state to fund abortions).
84. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (spousal notice).
85. Much of what is said about spousal or paternal rights applies with equal force to
parental rights. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
Spousal consent laws are generally held invalid, id., while some parental consent laws have
been sustained. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcraft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). Spousal notice
laws remain unaddressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Note, Husband Notification for Abor-
tion in Utah: A Patronizing Problem, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 609.
86. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 764 (1986) (striking down an informed consent provision, noting its "anti-abortion
character").
87. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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regarding the present legal status of the unborn'?
Clearly, the Webster decision has altered, and will continue to
alter, initiatives on protecting the unborn. As Justice Blackmun sug-
gested, many read the plurality opinion in Webster as an invitation
to state legislatures "to enact more and more restrictive abortion
regulations."88 Since Webster, serious legislative attempts to enact
such regulations have failed in Illinois and Florida, but have suc-
ceeded in Pennsylvania, where new sex selection, informed consent,
parental notice, and spousal notice abortion laws were recently
passed.8 9 While a few jurisdictions have engaged in more serious ef-
forts to restrict abortion,9" no one has yet succeeded in restricting
first trimester abortions. Several Supreme Court Justices have ob-
served, however, that governments have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the unborn throughout pregnancy9' and Justice Scalia opined
that the privacy right in Roe should be eliminated. 2
Aside from prompting anti-abortion forces to push state
lawmakers toward more restrictive abortion laws, Webster has
prompted pro-choice forces to push for state law recognition of the
type of privacy right found in Roe. If the constitutional privacy right
recognized in Roe is eliminated, states will acquire the responsibility
for defining privacy rights regarding pregnancy termination.9" No
one seriously contemplates a reversal of Roe so that a fetus will be
defined under the federal constitution as a "person" entitled to the
right to life.94 Forces advocating abortion rights under state law can
88. Id. at 3077.
89. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3204(c), 3205, 3206, 3209 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
90. See Abortion Amendment Makes Oregon Ballot, Chi. Trib., July 21, 1990, § 1, at 4,
col. I (voters to decide in Nov. 1990 on state constitutional amendment barring most abor-
tions); Louisiana Tries Again on Abortion, Chi. Trib., July 9, 1990, § 1, at 5, col. 6 (bill
passed which bans all abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or when maternal life is in
danger); Guam's Abortion Law Blocked, Chi. Trib. March 24, 1990, § 1, at 4, col. 3 (abortion
prohibited except when pregnancy endangers mother's life, but issue to be decided by voter
referendum in November); Idaho Senate OKs Bill Banning Most Abortions, Chi. Trib. March
23, 1990, § I, at 3, col. 2 (abortion would only be permitted if a woman's health is endan-
gered, if a fetus is deformed, or if there was rape or incest).
91. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989) (Rehnquist
plurality opinion, joined by White and Kennedy); Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynocologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist).
92. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia concurring).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. X (powers neither delegated by the federal constitution to the
federal government nor prohibited from exercise by the states are reserved for the states or for
the people).
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) ("person" as used in the fourteenth amend-
ment, does not include the unborn). Even in Illinois, where the legislature has declared that
human life begins at conception, the laws do not accord the unborn all the rights accorded
those born alive where Roe poses no barrier. See Parness, supra note 31.
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point to several supporting state court decisions, including a 1989
Florida Supreme Court ruling.95 Debates about state law present lo-
cal courts with difficult questions about judicial responsibility and
lawmaking authority, comparable to the debates and questions trig-
gered by the decision in Roe.
The increasing legal protections afforded potential human life,
as well as the renewed debate about abortion, raise questions about
the present legal status of the unborn. Foremost, it is clear that the
contemporary legal treatment of the unborn is both inconsistent and
inadequate. These inconsistencies and inadequacies are troubling for
two reasons. First, there are no comprehensive laws to protect the
unborn. Second, while abortion laws purport to protect potential
human life, many abortion laws actually seem to be initiatives
against women. These problems will not disappear even if the Su-
preme Court reverses Roe and each of the states quickly recognizes
or rejects a privacy right in abortion.
How are the unborn treated inconsistently under the law? Con-
sider the laws of both Illinois and Missouri, two states with a very
long and strong history of anti-abortion legislation.
In Illinois, the General Assembly responded critically to Roe.
The Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 includes a statement of "legisla-
tive intention" that says, in part:
[T]he [members of the] General Assembly . .. do sol-
emnly declare . in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of
this state, that the unborn child is a human being from the time
of conception, and is therefore a legal person for purposes of the
unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life
from conception under the laws and constitution of this state.
Further, the General Assembly finds . . . that [the] longstand-
ing policy . . . to protect the right to life of the unborn child
from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to pre-
serve the life of the mother is impermissible only because of the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and that, there-
fore, if those decisions . . . are ever reversed . . . then the for-
mer policy of this state to prohibit abortions unless necessary for
the preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated."
95. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (finding that the Florida Constitution
embodies the principle that a woman's right to make a choice about pregnancy termination is
fundamental). See also 1990 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. No. 90-113 (West) (early abortion solely
decided upon by pregnant woman in consultation with her physician).
96. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). A year earlier, the
Illinois legislature adopted a resolution urging a constitutional amendment to override Roe.
See S.J. Res. 32, 78th Gen. Assembly, 1974 Sess., 1974 I1. Laws 1674 (resolving that protec-
16
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With these assertions in mind, consider the following case:"7 On
January 21, 1978, Alan Greer spent much of the day in a tavern
drinking whiskey and beer. He left the tavern at about 5 p.m., saying
he was going home to "beat the hell out of his old lady." 98 Upon
arriving home, Alan fed his pigs and then argued with his eight and
a half month pregnant girlfriend, Sharon Moss, who had been living
with him. The argument led to a physical assault. Alan beat Sharon
with his fists, kicked her with his feet, and struck her repeatedly with
a broomstick. Then Alan tried to nurse Sharon. The next morning,
Alan summoned help for Sharon, but when the ambulance arrived,
Sharon was dead. The time of her death could not be established,
but it was clear that the beating caused Sharon's death and the
death of her fetus. Alan was charged with Sharon's murder and the
murder of the fetus. 9 Surprisingly, the Illinois high court found, in
1980, that Alan could not be charged with murdering the fetus since
Illinois law did not define murder as encompassing the unlawful kill-
ing of a fetus.' 00
In 1981, Illinois did pass such a murder statute, but surpris-
ingly, and notwithstanding the declarations in the 1975 Illinois
Abortion Law, the penalty for feticide was less strict than the pen-
alty for murder. More importantly, the legislature did not criminal-
ize all conduct leading to fetal death or birth disabilities. 101 Not un-
til 1986 did the unborn obtain comprehensive criminal law
protection's,0 2 but these protections also punish crimes against the
unborn less severely than crimes against the born."0 3 These reduced
penalties are at odds with Illinois's 1975 policy that considers an un-
born child to be a human being from the time of conception. In other
states, comparable statements about the value of potential life re-
tion should be afforded to all unborn human life throughout its development and that unborn
human life should be assured the equal protection of law).
97. The fact pattern is derived from People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203
(1980).
98. Id. at 108, 402 N.E.2d at 205.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 116, 402 N.E.2d at 209 ("We conclude that taking the life of a fetus is not
murder under our current statute unless the fetus is born alive and subsequently expires as a
result of the injuries inflicted.").
101. The 1981 Illinois feticide law is critically examined in Comment, Feticide in Illi-
nois., Legislative Amelioration of a Common Law Rule, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 91 (1983).
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989).
103. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para- 9-1.2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) ("The
sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree
murder, except that the death penalty may not be imposed."). As suggested by the court in
Roe, if the fetus is a person, then penalties for fetal death and for the death of those born alive
may not be different. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157, n.54 (1973).
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main wholly unaccompanied by supplementing criminal laws104
With the 1975 Illinois Abortion Law in mind, consider another
case:105 A woman who had given birth to a heroin-addicted child
appeared before a trial judge for a custody hearing. The hearing re-
sulted from a finding that the woman's drug abuse during pregnancy
constituted child abuse. At the hearing, the judge learned that the
woman was again pregnant and was addicted to heroin. The judge
ruled that the fetus was an abused child and appointed an officer of
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services as guardian
of the fetus.' The judge ordered the woman to cooperate with the
Department and to try to control her heroin intake. 10 7 The Children
and Family Services Department, surprisingly, moved to vacate the
court order, arguing that there was no juvenile court authority and
that the order created serious practical problems and policy issues.10 8
Again, this governmental reaction seems at odds with clearly articu-
lated state legislative policy. If anyone was to complain, it should
have been the woman.
Missouri has fewer criminal, child custody, and other laws ex-
pressly protective of the unborn than Illinois has. Yet last July, Mis-
souri defended before the U.S. Supreme Court a legislative preamble
which states, in part:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at
conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in
life, health and well-being; and
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have
protectable interests in the life, health and well-being of
their unborn children.
Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be
104. In Louisiana, for example, there is a longstanding policy of entitling unborn chil-
dren to the right to life from the time of conception. LA, REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.0 (West
Supp. 1990). Thus, the definition of "person" in the Louisiana Criminal Code has included the
unborn since 1976. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1986). Nevertheless, the state
high court ruled in 1980 that the unborn could not be victims of homicide. State v. Brown, 378
So. 2d 916 (La. 1980). While three degrees of feticide were added to the Criminal Code in
1989, possible punishment is less than that for comparable acts of homicide, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:30-31, 14:32.6-32.8 (West Supp. 1990) and there are no other crimes (such as
assault or battery) against the unborn.
105. The fact pattern is derived from In re Ridgeway, No. 82-J-319 (6th Cir. Ill. 1984),
described in Parness, supra note 31, at 20-22 (documents pertaining to the case are on file at
the Dickinson Law Review office).
106. In re Ridgeway, No. 82-J-319 (6th Cir. Ill. 1984).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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interpreted [wherever possible] . . . to acknowledge on behalf of
the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights
• . . available to other persons .... 1o0
Notwithstanding these statements, Missouri laws still appear to dis-
allow criminal prosecutions of persons like Alan Greer. " '
Further illustrations of inconsistent legal treatment of the un-
born abound. Enunciated public policies that are protective of poten-
tial human life are often not promoted by existing laws. Protective
laws that do exist are often incomplete and inadequate. These inade-
quacies, in part, result from the inability of pro-choice and pro-life
forces to find the common ground they share. For example, these
forces should have joined hands when the Illinois Legislature dis-
cussed the criminal prosecution of people like Alan Greer. The most
ardent pro-choice advocate should have recognized that Sharon
Moss's privacy right to abort was not implicated by the criminal
prosecution of Alan Greer and that she was, in fact, deprived of the
privacy right to bear a child because of his actions. " '
Similarly, the pro-life/pro-choice forces should join together to
urge Congress to mandate that states expand their Medicaid pro-
grams to include more extensive coverage for pregnant women.
Many American women today receive inadequate prenatal care, es-
pecially those who are poor. It seems strange to spend so much time
debating whether more extensive medical facilities are needed for 18
week rather than 20 week pregnancy terminations " 2 and so little
109. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3049 n.4 (1989) (citing
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
110. At one time, Missouri did characterize certain willful killings of unborn quick chil-
dren as manslaughter. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.026 (Vernon 1979). The relevant provision, how-
ever, was removed from the criminal code in 1984. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 565.026, repealed by L.
1983, p. 923, S.B. No. 276 § 1.
Use of existing criminal laws designating "persons" as victims of crime in order to protect
the unborn (see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (first degree murder))
is probably disallowed because of the so-called "born alive" rule. Forsythe, Homicide of the
Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. L. REV. 563
(1987) (born alive rule, under common law and in statutory analysis, allows only persons born
alive to be victims of crimes).
11l. In fact, regarding this type of criminal prosecution, a representative of the Illinois
ACLU wrote to Illinois legislators suggesting that because of Roe, state law could never char-
acterize the unborn as persons deserving some legal protection. Specifically, the letter said:
In making this decision, the Supreme Court unquestionably placed the re-
sponsibility for defining that point of fetal development at which "human life"
begins within the realm of private conscience and beyond the purview of govern-
mental intervention. Although Roe struck down a criminal abortion statute its
impact is not limited to the abortion context.
Letter from Colleen Connell, ACLU Staff Attorney, to Illinois Representatives (June 18,
1986) (opposing S.B. 1942) (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
112. The question about facilities was central to the out-of-court settlement that re-
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time finding ways to improve access to adequate prenatal care or to
encourage the use of birth control devices. Joint efforts by those es-
pousing fetal rights" 3 and those supporting a woman's right to
choose are necessary to fight for laws that limit third party intrusion
upon a woman's childbearing rights and laws that promote a wo-
man's ability to secure the live and healthy birth of a wanted child.
V. Conclusion
Some issues are ripe for legislative reform on behalf of the un-
born, though they are undoubtedly more controversial than are the
cries for increased governmental support of prenatal care and for ex-
panded education and research programs concerning the unborn.
The first issue ripe for reform involves assaults on pregnant
women. Alan Greer's assault on Sharon Moss not only killed her, but
also undermined both the general and individual interests in the po-
tential life of her unborn child. Alan's acts against the unborn child
should be criminalized. Further, crimes against the unborn should
not be limited to situations involving pregnancy termination or viable
fetuses or premeditated conduct. Birth disabilities, harm to previable
fetuses, and reckless behavior that may harm the fetus should also
be illegal.
The second issue ripe for reform concerns tort actions against
third parties by children born with birth disabilities." '4 In particular,
preconception torts-that is, civil claims involving conduct that pre-
ceded the claimant's conception, but that caused the claimant's birth
disabilities-should be recognized. Preconception torts do, however,
moved Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), from the U.S. Supreme Court
docket after certiorari had been granted. Abortion Case Talk Stalls Over Where and When,
Chi. Trib. Nov. 21, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 2 ("settlement negotiations ... stalled . . . over a key
issue: At what point in a pregnancy should a woman seeking an abortion be required to go to a
facility more sophisticated than an abortion clinic . . . . Dr. Bernard Turnock, Director of the
Illinois Department of Public Health, wants women who undergo abortions after 18 weeks of
gestation to do so in highly regulated ambulatory surgical centers or hospitals. The ACLU
wants women to be able to have abortions in less-regulated, less-expensive abortion clinics
through 20 weeks' gestation . . . .").
113. See, e.g., Parness, Letter, Abortion and the Unborn: Refraining the Issue, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 12 (noting the benefits of talking about protecting potential life rather
than whether a fetus is a person, including the diminished likelihood of an "'all or nothing"
mentality in which the unborn are viewed as being comparable to the born either in all re-
spects or in no respect).
114. Tort reforms involving parental duties have been urged, but they trigger more sig-
nificant questions including issues of immunities under common law and issues of federal and
state constitutional rights such as childrearing and bodily autonomy. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 24; Note, Developing Maternal Liability Standards for Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN's L
REV. 592 (1987); Comment, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the Prenatal
Period, 1989 U. ILL. L.F. 493.
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trigger concerns about stale claims, difficulties of proof, and the pos-
sibility that successive generations will sue over genetic changes in-
flicted upon their ancestors.11 5
The third and perhaps most controversial issue deserving legis-
lative attention concerns the legal duties that prospective parents
owe their unborn children. Here, federal constitutional rights involv-
ing childbegetting, childrearing, and bodily autonomy are often im-
plicated. Therefore, more compelling governmental interests and
more careful legal drafting are required. Nevertheless, parental du-
ties should be expanded so that potential life is more completely pro-
tected. Such an expansion can, and should, occur without the troub-
ling characterization of the unborn as "persons." The unborn can be
protected much like snaildarters or historic buildings. Any expansion
of parental duties would, of course, have a significant impact upon
the fundamental rights of pregnant women. Yet, these duties are not
inappropriate even though women can opt to terminate the preg-
nancy. It was clearly wrong for the grand jury in Rockford, Illinois
to refuse to indict a woman who transmitted cocaine to her unborn
child, thereby causing the child's death, because the jury was con-
cerned about the woman's right to bodily privacy.116 There was no
privacy right involved. It is illegal to use certain drugs whether or
not the user is pregnant. The harm caused by drugs is intensified
when potential life is involved. A pregnant woman's legal duties
should contemplate not only the possibility of punishment for mis-
conduct during pregnancy, but also the possibility of coercive gov-
ernmental action intended to prevent harm to the unborn.
Finally, parental duties should be expanded for prospective fa-
thers. Legislatures and courts must recognize the need for greater
equality in the responsibilities assigned to prospective mothers and
fathers. The Florida Supreme Court's recent recognition of the bio-
115. Renslow, 67 II1. 2d at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
116. Grand Jury Won't Indict Mother in Baby's Drug Death, Chi. Trib. May 27, 1989,
at 1, col. 5 (". . . her arrest drew criticism from women's rights activists who branded the
prosecution a violation of her right to privacy and control over her own body .... Those
issues apparently were also on the minds of the grand jury members according to Paul Logli,
the Winnebago County State's Attorney..."). It may not have been wrong to determine that
the criminal statute on delivery of illegal drugs was not intended to apply to the case at hand.
Because the woman's child was born alive and then died as a result of drug exposure, and
because Illinois follows the born alive rule for homicide prosecutions, People v. Greer, 79 III.
2d 103, 116, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980), other criminal provisions were seemingly available.
Yet, the 1986 Illinois initiatives on crimes against the unborn, see supra note 102, were un-
available because pregnant women were immunized from prosecution. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2(b), 9-2.1(d), 9-3.2(c), 12-3.1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (crimes of
homicide, manslaughter, and battery of unborn child do not apply to pregnant women who
carried the victim).
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logical father's duty to provide support during the prebirth period is
a step in the right direction," 7 as is California's mandate that all
prospective parents provide care for their unborn." ' In fact, prebirth
paternity actions are also ripe for new legal developments." 9 These
actions would not only protect potential human life, but would also
protect maternal health. Permitting such actions may also help re-
move at least some of the concern that legal initiatives on behalf of
the unborn constitute no more than sex discrimination in disguise.
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
119. A number of state statutes expressly permit such filings. But compare, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 9-10-103(a) (1987) ("If the child is not born when the accused appears ... the
court may . . . make temporary orders and findings pending the birth of the child.") with ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2507(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) ("If an action ...is brought
before the birth of the child, all proceedings shall be stayed until after the birth, except for
service or process, the taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony, and the ordering of blood
tests under appropriate circumstances.").
